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IN ITHE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
.STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLIS E. WALKER, \ 
Plaintiff and Resppndent, ' 
-vs.- J 
LEVI G. PETER.SON, 
Defenda;nt and Appellant .. 
Case No. 8213 
PLAINTIF·F·'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF: FACTS· 
Defendant has failed to include some facts which the 
plaintiff considers important to the presentation of his 
side of the case and the ref ore briefly restates the facts 
in this brief. 
This was an action to recover damages to plaintiff's 
vehicle which arose out of an accident that occurred at an 
intersection in the north city limits of Bear River City, 
Utah on the 14th day of April, 1952 at about 11 :30 A.M. 
The road was dry and visibility was good. (R. 4, Lines 
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4, 12, 13, 18 and 20). The plaintiff was traveling south 
on h'ighway 30-South (an arterial highway) approach-
ing Bear R.iver City, Utah and had as a passenger in 
his car with him his wife. The defendant had been travel-
ing north on said highway but had stopped his car east 
of the hard surface on said highway some 20 or 30 feet 
south from the intersection in question for the purpose 
of talking business with another party. The other party 
had been driving a truck which was parked north of the 
intersection and on the east side of said highway 30-
South. After the conversation had ended the defendant 
went to his car and the third party went to his truck and 
both drivers commenced to go back on the· hard surface 
of the highway, the truck proceeding in a northerly di-
rection and the defendant proceeding north for a short 
distance and then making a left hand turn into the inter-
section to go west. 
After re-entering his car defendant states that he 
checked the highway for other traffic, (R. 72, Lines 23-
30; R. 73, Lines 1 to 3). He first saw the plaintiff's 
vehicle coming from the north just after he re-entered 
his car. (R. 73, Lines 4 to 9). According to Mr. Peterson, 
at this time the plaintiff's vehicle was still in a 60 mile 
per hour zone· (R. 73, Lines 29 and 30), and he states that 
the plaintiff's car was still in that zone when the defend-
ant pulled onto the highway. '(R. 74, Lines 1 to 4). How-
ever, an indep·endent witness, Mr. Alvin Madsen, who was 
traveling behind the Walker car testified under careful 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
cross-exan1ination by defendant's counsel that he first 
sa\v the defendant's car moving when he, Madsen, was 
about 500 to 600 feet north of the intersection (R. 39, 
Lines 7 to 19), and that at this point he was traveling 
at about 300 feet behind VValker (R·. 39, Lines 20 to 29), 
which would thus put plaintiff 200 to 300 feet from the 
intersection. The plaintiff testified that when he first 
saw the defendant, defendant was coming from behind 
the truck and just entering his lane of traffic (R. 58, 
Lines 18 and 19) and that the small stock truck was just 
entering its lane of traffic from the left side of the road. 
(R. 59, Lines 1 to 14). He also testified that his esti-
Inate would be that the distance he was away from de-
fendant's vehicle when he first saw it was approximately 
100 feet (R,. 58, Lines 4 to 7). He stated that he had time 
to apply his brakes and sound his horn but no chance 
to change his direction. Officer Sackett, witness for the 
defendant who investigated the accident and measured 
the skid marks made by the plaintiff's vehicle testified 
that the plaintiff laid down 148 feet of skid marks prior 
to impact. (R. 98, Lines 2, 5, 6 and 13). 
The defendant testified that after he first saw the 
Walker car in the 60 mile per hour zone, which was aC-
cording to defendant's testimony, over 127 paces away 
from the center of the intersection, (R. 119, Lines 5 to 
10). He did not look for the plaintiff's car again until 
the plaintiff honked his' horn, at which time defendant 
could see that he was going to get hit (R. 127, Lines 23 
to 28). When the plaintiff honked his horn defendant 
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testified that plaintiff was 150 to 200 feet fron1 the inter-
section (R. 120, Lines 5, 6; R. 130, Lines 3 to 5), and de-
fendant further states that he was near the center line 
of the highway when he heard the plaintiff's horn. (R. 
128, Line 22 ; R. 119, Line 28). 
The court found that Mr~ Walker was exceeding 
the speed limit of 60 miles per hour when he was. in the 
60 mile per hour zone (although there is no evidence in 
the record to support this finding) and also found that 
he was traveling at a speed five miles or more in excess 
of 45 miles per hour as the W a.lker car approached the 
intersection, and that said speed constituted negligence, 
but that the p-roximate cause of the accident was the 
defendant's negligence in making a left turn on a through 
highway and his failure to keep a p-roper lookout. (R. 131, 
Lines 1 to 26). 
STATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POIN'T NO. I. 
WHETHER THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER 
LOOKOUT. 
POINT NO. II. 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGEN·CE, AS 
FOUND BY THE COURT, IN DRIVING AT A SPEED IN 
EXCESS OF THE POSTED SPEED, DID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POIN'T NO. I. 
WHETHER THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER 
LOOKOUT. 
Plaintiff's testimony that he did not see the Peter-
son car until he was 100 feet away conflicts with the 
graphic evidence laid down by the plaintiff's car by way 
of skid marks to the extent of 148 feet prior to the point 
of impact. Obviously plaintiff made an incorrect estimate 
of the distance when he stated he first saw defendant's 
car 100 feet away. The plaintiff testified that he saw 
the defendant's car as it pulled out from behind the truck 
and that he honked his horn and applied his brakes when 
he saw the defendant's vehicle start to cross the highway. 
The defendant testifed that when he heard the plain-
tiff's horn the plaintiff was in the neighborhood of 200 
feet north of the intersection and it would appear, using 
the brake marks of 148 feet and the reaction time of three 
fourths of a second prior to the application of brakes and 
while the plaintiff was traveling at approximately 45 
miles per hour (which the court found the plaintiff was 
traveling) 200 feet would be closer to the distance that the 
plaintiff first noticed the danger created by the defend-
ant's automobile. Both the plaintiff and the independent 
witness, Mr. Madsen, testified that the defendant's car 
came from behind the truck and made the left turn. 
The truck apparently obscured plaintiff's vision of de-
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fendant's vehicle for part of the tilne. Certainly under 
the evidence presented it was a question of fact for the 
court to detern1ine whether or not the plaintiff failed 
to keep a proper lookout and there was sufficient evi-
dence that the plaintiff \vas keeping a proper lookout. 
POINT NO. II. 
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGEN·CE, AS 
FOUND BY THE COURT, IN DRIVING AT A SPEED IN 
EXCESS OF 'THE POSTED SPEED, DID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT. 
Counsel for defendant wants the court to decide 
that the sole proximate cause of this accident was not the 
improper left hand turn of the defendant and his failure 
to keep a p,roper lookout. He contends that the plaintiff, 
whom the court found was traveling in excess of the 
posted speed limit as he approached the intersection 
was guilty of contributory negligence. This is a question 
of fact to be decided by the court sitting as trier of the 
facts. See 5 American J ur ., page 882, Sec. 689, where it is 
said: 
"It is generally for the jury to decide whether 
the speed of the vehicle proximately contributed 
to the accident and whether such speed was excess-
ive considering in connection therewith the ha-
zards of the surrounding circumstances." 
See also: 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law and Practice, Part I, page 662, Section 6607 where 
it is said: 
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"Speed in excess of that permitted by statute, 
ordinance or other traffic regulation may consti-
tute negligence per se. Nevertheless, there is still 
a jury question as to whether or not such violation 
\Vas the proximate cause of the injury or damage 
complained of." 
The case of Yeates v. Bu . dge, decided by this court 
J'anuary 1~, 1953, 252 Pac. (2nd) 220 raises the very 
point in question here. In that case, in which the defend-
ant \vas n1aking a left turn at an intersection, the trial 
court found that the plaintiff traveling in the opposite 
direction fro1n the defendant was driving too fast for 
existing conditions, but decided, nevertheless, that the 
sole and proxi1nate cause of the accident was the left turn 
of the defendant without signal and when the plaintiff 
\Vas so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Our 
Supreme Court in that matter referred to the case of 
Cederloff v. Whited cited in the appellant's brief but 
stated that it did not need to go to the extent of the hold-
ing in the Cederlof case since the Cederlof case was de-
cided as n1atter of law whereas in the Y ea,tes v. Budge 
case the trial court (the fact finder) found Mrs. Y eate's 
negligence to be the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Such is the case in the rna tter now hef ore this court. 
The court was clearly correct in finding that the proxi-
Inate cause of the accident was the improper left turn of 
the defendant and that plaintiff's speed was not con-
tributory negligence. If defendant had exercised the care 
required of a reasonably prudent man he would have 
checked the progress of the Walker vehicle prior to cross-
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ing into the south bound lane of traffic. Had the defend-
ant taken the time to make an estimate of the plaintiff's 
speed, he would have ascertained \vithout the slighte~t 
trouble that at plaintiff's speed it was not sa.fp or prudent 
to pToceed into the south bound lane of traffic. '11lH_) dP-
fendant cannot complain that he "\Vas 1nislead or lulled in-
to a false sense of security by pla:intiff's speed or distance 
from the intersection because defendant never seriously 
took pains to calculate either. There is a conflict in the 
evidence as to the respective location of the tw'o vehicles 
at any particular time but there is sufficient evidence so 
that the trial court could find that the plaintiff's vehicle 
was so close to the intersection as to cause it to be an 
immediate hazard to the defendant's vehicle at the time 
it was making a left turn and this could be true even had 
the plaintiff been traveling at 40 miles per hour, the 
posted speed limit. The front of plaintiff's vehicle struck 
the right front of defendant's car, headlight and right 
front wheel. If the plaintiff had been traveling a little 
slower he would have perhaps struck the car in the n1iddle 
or a little toward the hack. 
Defendant's counsel has gone into detail and dis-
cussed many of the Utah left turn cases. However, each 
of these cases was decided upon the individual facts and 
circumstances of the case. For the most part the facts 
in each case have been set out in appellant's brief .. A. 
reading of the cases cited by the appellant's counsel clear-
ly indicates the th-oughts and holding of the Utah Su-
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pre1ne Court on cases involving left hand turns. In 
Ccderloff v. Whited,, 169 Pac. (2nd) 777, 778, the 
Court says: 
"Had plaintiff's car run into the rear end of 
defendant's car after the front end thereof had 
entirely crossed plaintiff's course of travel there 
might have been some question whether the turn 
could be 1nade with reasonable safety .... " 
In the present case, plaintiff struck the right front of 
defendant's car, headlight and right front wheel. (R. 
6, Lines 29 and 30, R. 7, Lines 1 and 2). In Hart v. Kerr, 
175 Pac. (2nd) 475, 477, Mr. Justice Pratt says: 
"There seems to be rather an obvious conclu-
sion at which to arrive from the evidence; plain-
tiff knew the defendant was coming fast .... " 
IIere the defendant knew or ought to have known that 
plaintiff was coming fast, 
" ... and plaintiff's automobile was hit in 
front of its center ... The conclusion: Plaintiff 
took a chance upon a faulty estimate of distance 
and speed, and lost." 
Isn't that what this defendant did~ He made a faulty 
esti1nate of distance and con1pletely neglected his duty 
to 1nake any esti1nate of plaintiff's speed. In Hickok v. 
Skinner, 190 Pac. (2nd) 512, plaintiff is non-suited. The 
court by ~fr. Justice Latimer remarked: 
''Plaintiff made no effort to estimate the 
speed of the approaching vehicle." 
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Again at page 516 plaintiff is rapped by the Court. 
"For his prolonged inattention to the traffic 
that was approaching west on 21st South." 
"He testified that having once seen defend-
ant's automobile approaching the intersection, 400 
to 500 feet to the east, he started his car forward 
from a point 20 feet back from the intersection, 
drove into and almost across the intersection or a 
distance of 65 feet without ever looking again in 
the direction from \vhich defendant's car was ap-
proaching." 
For his failure to estimate the speed of the approaching 
vehicle, for his failure to look again, the court found 
that he "failed to act in prudent and careful manner." 
But, it is in French v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 216 
Pac. (2nd) 1002 that we find some of the clearest lan-
guage in support of plaintiff's case. In this case plain-
tiff was driving north on 2nd West in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Defendant's truck and trailer was going south on 
the west lane of traffic. Plaintiff made a left turn at 
4th South and was hit by the d€fendant in the right front 
fender. At the time of making the left hand turn plain-
tiff was going 8 m.p.h. and the defendant \vas about 120 
feet away traveling 20 or 25 m.p.h. At this point plaintiff 
was son1ewhere in the intersection. The Court said at 
page 1003: 
"In giving the plaintiff the benefit of the evi-
dence more favorable to him, we conclude that at 
the time he en t.ered the intersection and in tended 
to make his turn to the left, defendant's truck was 
not in the intersection. However, we are forced to 
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conclude that regardless of the variation in the 
stories of plaintiff as to the relative location of 
the vehicles the evidence conclusively establishes 
that the truck was so close to the intersection at 
the tin1e plaintiff intended to and did turn west 
as to constitute an immediate hazard." 
and at page 1004 : 
"'When a statute prescribes that a turning 
vehicle 1nust yield the right of way when the latter 
is close enough to constitute a hazard it antici-
pates the exercise of reasonable judgment, on the 
part of the driver turning. I-Iowever, a burden is 
placed on the driver making the turn as he has 
control of the situation, and if there is a reason-
able probability that the movement cannot be 
1nade in safety, then the disfavored driver should 
yield. The driver proceeding straight ahead has 
little opportunity to know a vehicle is to he turned 
across his path until the movement is commenced 
and in many instances, the warning is too late for 
the latter driver to take effective action." 
It is therefore readily apparent that each case cited by 
plaintiff and defendant was determined on the particu-
lar facts and circumstances surrounding each accident. 
No court can lay down a rule to indicate what is so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. ·This is a question 
of fact. Just as whether or not the speed of the vehicle 
did or did not contribute to an accident. We have simply 
tried to point out in this brief that the court in this case 
\\"as fully justified in finding that the sole and proiXimate 
cause of the accident was the defendant's improper left 
hand turn. Section -!1-6-73, U.C.A. 1953 says: 
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"The driver of a vehicle w·ithin an intersection 
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle approaching from the oppo-
site direction which is within the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitu-te an immediate hazard, 
but said driver, having so yielded and having 
given a signal when and as required by this act, 
may make such left turn and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection from 
said opposite direction shall yield the right of way 
to the vehicle n1aking the left turn." 
Here the plaintiff was approaching the intersection rap-
idly and had the defendant exercised even the simplest 
measure of precaution, had he attempted to make even 
a superficial appraisal of the relative position of the 
plaintiff's car to his own, he would never have attempted 
the maneuver which caused this accident. 
This is true even though the plaintiff had been 
traveling at 40 m.p.h. That even at 40 m.p.h. defendant 
turned so close that it was impossible for plaintiff to 
successfully stop his vehicle to avoid the accident. Thus, 
if plaintiff could not stop at 40 m.p.h. in time to keep 
from hitting the defendant's car, he eannot be accused of 
contributory negligence because he was slightly exceeding 
40 miles per hour as he approached the intersection. De-
fendant was not in any way mislead by plaintiff's ex-
cessive speed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that there are ample facts 
to support the trial court's finding that defendant's 
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the acci-
dent and that there "\Vas no error in the judgment made 
and entered by the lower court ·and that the same should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STR.ONG, 
WILLIAM S. FRANK, and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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